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INFRASTRUCTURES RISK MANAGEMENT
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ABSTRACT

The term “digital infrastructures” is used to refer to one or more of a combination of IoT and its artifacts, the cloud,
cyber-physical systems, and digitized business architectures. As digital infrastructures become increasingly complex
and interdependent, impacts from disruptive events have the potential to be more harmful than mere inconveniences
and financial losses. The risk from these catastrophic events to digital infrastructures may leave many organizations
unprepared. To predict so-called “Black Swan Events" to increasingly complex digital infrastructures this research
in progress postulates that risk management activities should be conducted outside of existing frameworks. In this
paper, we argue that qualitative scenario risk modeling exercises utilizing diverse stakeholders may become even
more important than other types of risk analysis in the prediction of threats to digital infrastructures. We discuss the
importance of diverse stakeholders in developing structured, qualitative, scenario models to predict Black Swan
Events to digital infrastructures. We discuss potential issues and solutions for the cataloging and quantification of
the use cases developed from qualitative event scenario modeling and the next steps for this research.
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BACKGROUND

The pace of technological change has made it difficult for any single organization to be able to protect its
infrastructure independently because information security is a complex ecosystem of attackers and defenders
involved in a perpetual game of cat and mouse (Knapp, Morris, Rainer Jr, & Byrd, 2003). This significantly
increases cyber-risks to organizations that do not properly manage threats and opportunities from employees,
intermediaries, contractors, partners, suppliers, governments, and even regulators. Currently, negative consequences
from threats and missed opportunities in managing cyber-risks can best be described as mere inconveniences and
recoverable financial losses to the organizations and the people impacted by them. Consider the January 2016 outage
at a Verizon data center, which caused flight delays for airlines and shut down its website, booking, and check-in
systems (Sverdlik, 2016). In March 2016, MedStar Health chain of hospital systems was hacked preventing patients
from booking appointments in addition to leaving staff unable to check email messages or look up phone numbers.
The organization reverted to a paper based system and proclaimed that patient care was not impacted (Gillum,
Dishneau, & Abdollah, 2016). Furthermore, the frequency of data breaches has gone from 1 breach every 2 days in
2005 to 2 breaches a day in 2015 to 4 breaches a day in 2019 (Identity Theft Resource Center, 2020). The most
common outcome of data breaches is identity thefts (Moore, 2010). However, in 2013, 86% of identity theft victims
had personal out of pocket expenses which amounted to less than one hundred dollars (Harrell & Langston, 2013).
In addition, academic researchers are not clear on the market implications of data breaches. It has been difficult for
researchers to articulate the full potential impacts and long-term consequences of cyber-risks to organizations; with
the research suggesting that there may not be long-term impacts from breach disclosures (Acquisti, Friedman, &
Telang, 2006; Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2011; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004). Many organizations may
then perceive that there are no apparent long-term consequences from the mismanagement of cyber-risks. This
environment has made it difficult for organizations to understand how to view and manage their cyber-risks. It is
apparent that threats and missed opportunities to manage cyber-risks to digital infrastructures within business
organizations are not viewed in the same way as those towards physical infrastructures. This is possibly because
they are not perceived as being life-altering. However, over the last two decades these cyber-risks have indeed been
taken seriously for government-owned and managed digital infrastructures such as SCADA systems; which are at
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the heart of such operations as power grids, air traffic control systems, and water systems (See Nicholson, Webber,
Dyer, Patel, & Janicke, 2012 for a literature review). This research stream while a starting point for business
organizations to begin to think about the management of cyber-risks; does not do enough to address the diverse
operating environments and competing goals unique to business organizations. In addition, much of the research
regarding government-owned and managed digital infrastructures is classified leaving out a large community of
researchers and business organizations in which to share findings with, despite business organizations being the
largest component of the cybersecurity problems in the United States (Roswell, 2009).
Mismanagement of risks is never inconsequential, even in the long run. Seemingly unrelated risks can be linked
together where one consequence has the potential to lead to other unforeseen and exponentially impactful
consequences. Consider the events leading up to the devastating September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These events
had existing elements of risks that when combined created the ‘perfect storm’ for a catastrophe. The potential
connection among and between existing elements of risks was not readily apparent to those responsible for
managing them. In the cybersecurity space, we already see such a phenomenon in so-called “Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT)” where sophisticated cyberattacks are established within the information technology infrastructure of
an organization for obtaining information and/or undermining missions, programs, and organizations. APT’s can go
on for many years before being detected and are characterized by multiple forms of attacks including physical
attacks and acts of deception (Brewer, 2011; Virvilis, Gritzalis, & Apostolopoulous, 2014). Events such as the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks are examples of “Black Swan '' events. Black Swan events can be broadly
defined as those extremely impactful, catastrophic events that lie outside the realm of known predictive capabilities;
nothing in the past can convincingly point to their possibility (Taleb, 2007; pg.xvii). An interesting aspect of Black
Swan events is that despite their surprise factor, these events are easily explainable and predictable after the event
has occurred (Taleb, 2007; pg xviii).
There is some debate about whether or not Black Swan Events truly exist. Some experts believe that Black Swan
events are nothing more than emerging risks; others view them as physical manifestations of high impact but very
low probability events – so-called worst-case scenarios. Emerging risks are defined as new or familiar risks that
become apparent in new or unfamiliar conditions whose consequences are not fully understood or appreciated;
emerging risks may actually lessen over time or become worse than expected (Flage & Aven, 2015). One example
of an emerging risk to an organization is that encountered by the now defunct video retailer BlockBuster. It did not
have the ability to manage threats and opportunities from electronic self-service kiosks (Redbox) and online
streaming services (Netflix). Mismanagement of these emerging risks led BlockBuster to eventually file for
bankruptcy (Abell, 2010; Sandler, 2010; Arnold, 2010). In contrast, Werther (2013), argues however that Black
Swan events are simply on the tail end of predictive models and are not a new phenomenon at all. Black Swan
events can be considered the manifestation of very low probability but very high impact events that are accounted
for but not necessarily describable. With this perspective, we can see how Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath may
be considered the physical manifestation of a 1 in 100 year Hurricane event – an event which is modeled but not
describable. We argue however that the construct of Black Swan events is still needed. Organizations, whether they
would like to admit, have to be ready to manage previously unimaginable worst-case scenarios in order to survive.
We define Black Swan events as those events that are not foreseeable by existing mathematical and logical models;
these events have never taken place before. Experts within the domain may be unable to predict these events as they
are constrained by prior life experiences and biases (Nafday, 2009). Domain experts have a tendency to focus on the
known sources of uncertainty while ignoring the complexity of reality (Taleb, Goldstein, & Spitznagel, 2009). We
argue that domain experts do not suffer from the uncertainty about Black Swan events per se but the uncertainty that
comes from that lack of deep unknowing knowledge. This is different from a conscious awareness that one does not
know. In other words, these events are truly not considered during the course of organizational risk assessment.
These are not high impact, low-frequency events. They are not within the imagination of the people responsible for
risk management, assessments, analysis (Flage & Aven, 2015; Fischbacher-Smith, 2010; pg 5).
From another perspective, Black Swan events may be viewed as incorrect risk assessments due to the lack of
knowledge from the right sources (Aven, 2013). This is our viewpoint of Black Swan events as well. To hedge
against the risks of Black Swan Events to emerging digital infrastructures we argue that it is important that as many
diverse roles and actors are actively utilized in the practice of cyber-risk management, not just those practitioners
within the information systems function. A Black Swan event is best imagined by the collective knowledge,
experience, and observations of all people within the organizations. In addition, we argue that management
information systems researchers are uniquely positioned to further research in this area in order to assist business
organizations.
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Business Organizations and Researchers

Business organizations and researchers need to begin to work collectively and independently to imagine the Black
Swans to digital infrastructures. In order for this to be realized (1) organizations need to conduct risk management
activities outside the confines of traditional governance processes and frameworks., (2) organizations and
researchers must utilize divergent experts and collective intelligence, (3) organizations will need to share
information with researchers, (4) researchers must attempt to make technical knowledge and findings accessible to
the layman and applicable to the field while also advancing theory for future researchers to build on.
Organizations need to conduct risk management activities outside the confines of traditional governance processes
and frameworks. Organizations have at their disposal a number of existing governance frameworks and mandates to
help manage cyber-risks to their organizations. However, rules and regulations are established to manage risks that
are defined and predictable. Future Black Swan events will be unrelated to and fall outside of the context of any
current rules (Mclean, 2010). In addition, most information security textbooks, standards, recommendations, and
best practices indicate that risks must be properly identified, analyzed and evaluated before the organization can
move forward; however many frameworks and methodologies are found not to be applicable in the field (Oppliger,
2015). These systems can get wieldy with their paperwork, approval processes, and general organizational
bureaucracy which may disable the organization from quickly responding to emerging threats and opportunities. It is
not enough to rely on governance and mandatory compliance measures to manage cyber-risks for business
organizations; many organizations do not fully practice their existing governance frameworks (Avery & Cheek,
2015; Jourdan, Rainer Jr, Marshall, & Ford, 2010). This does not mean that they still cannot manage risks to their
digital infrastructures. To hedge this, it is important that MIS researchers understand the current gaps in knowledge
and that organizations conduct proper event scenario modeling to truly understand gaps in cyber-risk management as
well as imagine and articulate Black Swan events on the digital infrastructures.
Business organizations and researchers must utilize divergent experts and collective intelligence to predict (or
imagine) Black Swan Events to digital infrastructures. A characteristic of Black Swan Events is that they appear as
if they should have been predictable but only after the fact. Just because experts within a domain claim that they will
not be able to predict a Black Swan event should not prevent us from trying to understand (a) what the potential
worst case scenarios will look like from cyber-risks to digital infrastructures, and (b) how an organization can best
respond to these events before, during, and after to minimize the impacts.
There is a great deal of evidence that certain kinds of analysts and experts using the same information and methods
available to everyone else are consistently better at predicting extreme events (Werther, 2013; pgs 14-19). To truly
understand risks to digital infrastructures there needs to be diverse and divergent experts working together. In
organizations, this means having practitioners whose life experiences and biases are somewhat outside of the STEM
domains. These practitioners may be able to see connections between risks that classically trained experts may not
see. For researchers this means academic domains coming together to make technical knowledge and findings
accessible to the layman and applicable to the field while also advancing theory for researchers to build on. The MIS
domain is at a unique intersection between organizational science, information science, academic institutions,
organizations, as well as the IT industry and various professional groups which encompass it. Benbasat & Zmud
(2003), posit that MIS is focused on IT infrastructures and IT business solutions and the immediate consequences
and antecedents of these information systems. For this reason, MIS researchers should lead the charge regarding
cyber-risks to digital infrastructures. We acknowledge that there are major differences between information security
research (In this paper, cyber-risks, information security, and cybersecurity are used interchangeably and refer to the
same constructs but in different contexts ) and other types of MIS research. The former may have relegated the
majority of the research to the hard sciences. Siponen (2008) notes that the major differences between information
security research and information systems research is a lack of theory, no focus on management, and no focus on
empirical methods and the two operate as different fields with different systems of cultural values. At the time this
was attributed to the immaturity of the information security research field. Although progress has been made via
calls for action in MIS “special issue” journals (see Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010; Warkentin &
Willison, 2009), it is not clear that enough research has been done in the MIS domain regarding information security
in the context of business organizations. This has left the research gap to be addressed by practitioner-oriented
whitepapers, typically selling a service or product or has been appropriated to the computer science and engineering
domains where the research is often quantitatively and theoretically conceptual with little consideration given to the
complexities of people within organizations and the day-to-day business operations. Some of this perhaps is due to
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the fact that organizations are hesitant to share security related information due to market fears and negative
perceptions associated with having to publicly disclose an information security failure. (Jourdan, Rainer Jr,
Marshall, & Ford, 2010; Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003; Moore, 2010). These fears are unsubstantiated
however in the context of academic research. There are guidelines built-in place to protect the integrity and
confidentiality of research data. Academic research has been used to study highly sensitive personal topics such as
sexually transmitted diseases and the illicit drug use of private individuals (for an example of such research see
Turner et al (1998)). Academic researchers can surely be trusted to study information security within organizations.
Without the sharing of information and data, it is difficult for researchers to conduct rigorous empirical research to
answer important research questions and advance theory
Business organizations must share information and data with academic researchers. Academic researchers can
provide the business community with unbiased empirical research to understand what works, how to save money,
and how to optimize risk mitigation measures. A structured literature review in the information systems, computer
science, and engineering domains must be conducted to better understand the research gaps regarding organizational
guidance on how to manage cyber-risks to digital infrastructures; and this will be the next step for this research. It
will be important to articulate the research gaps so organizations can imagine what the Black Swan events may look
like for them. Next, we discuss why structured event scenario modeling is important and the unique challenges of
developing such a framework.
MODELING DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURES RISK & CONCLUSION

Scenarios are narratives that use logical implications, assumptions, and forecasts to communicate about a potential
future state; it incorporates issues to be resolved, time relations, interactions and consequences (Gray & Hovav,
2014; Kim & Cha, 2011). Scenarios are most powerful when several of them are used together and can allow
organizations to take risk management actions such as changing business practices or innovating (Gray & Hovav,
2014). One major benefit of scenario modeling in the context of organizational risk management is that it allows
risks to be articulated in the absence of unequivocal clear evidence. It reduces the burden of proof challenge brought
about by the organizations’ need to balance competing demands of performance and risk management (FischbacherSmith, 2010). In addition, divergent experts can easily articulate their knowledge to domain experts. Use-case
scenarios generated from qualitative scenario modeling are specific enough to be categorized, archived, and
quantified to understand Black Swan risks to an organization's digital infrastructure. This “cataloging” of use-case
scenarios may enable organizations to develop risk management playbooks to mitigate losses from these events.
Additional research on the utilization of existing cybersecurity risk management framework as potential ontologies
for the cataloging of these use cases is needed particularly in the context of business research.
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